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The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002), where the defendant in a district court criminal action may take 
an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final order for anything other than a first degree 
or capital felony offense. In the underlying case related to this appeal, Appellant Ray-
mond Mc Arthur was convicted of two counts of threatening with or using a dangerous 
weapon in a fight or quarrel, class A misdemeanor offenses under Utah Code Ann. § 76-
10-506 (1999). A copy of the original judgment is attached hereto as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are as follows: Whether the trial court failed to 
comply with Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) in accepting defendant's guilty pleas, where the 
court did not ascertain whether defendant read, understood, or acknowledged a written 
statement that he was waiving his right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury; and 
where the trial court failed to ascertain if defendant understood the nature and elements 
of the offenses to which the pleas were entered. Also, whether the record in this case 
fails to support a factual basis for both guilty pleas. 
Standard of Review: This Court will review for correctness whether a trial court 
has strictly complied with the constitutional and procedural requirements of accepting a 
guilty plea. State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, ^14, 26 P.3d 203; see also State v. Smith. 812 
P.2d 470,476 (Utah Ct. App. 19911 cert, denied. 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991) (a trial 
court's failure to comply strictly with Utah R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting a guilty or no 
contest plea is good cause, as a matter of law, for the withdrawal of that plea). In this 
case, McArthur filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. The trial court denied that 
motion. On appeal, McArthur is challenging the trial court's ruling on grounds that were 
not raised below. Thus, McArthur is challenging the trial court's ruling here under the 
plain-error doctrine. See State v. Dean. 2002 UT App 323, ffi[3 & 9, 57 P.3d 1106, cert, 
granted. 64 P.3d 586 (Utah 2003). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
Although McArthur filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas in the trial court 
(see Record ("R.") at 53-57, and 87), he is challenging the denial of that motion on 
grounds that were not raised below. See Dean. 2002 UT App 323, %3. For that reason, 
McArthur has raised the arguments on appeal in this case under the plain-error doctrine. 
Under that doctrine, McArthur must show that ff(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should 
have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful." Dean. 2002 UT App 
2 
323, p (quoting State v. Hittle. 2002 UT App 134,1J5, 47 P.3d 101). 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provisions will be determinative of the issues on appeal: Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-10-506 (1999), 76-5-102 (Supp. 2003), and 76-5-103 (1999); and Utah R. 
Crim. P. 11(e) (2003). The text of those provisions is contained in Addendum B, hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings. Disposition in the Court Below. 
On October 29, 2002, the state charged Raymond McArthur with two felony 
offenses (aggravated assaults) and four misdemeanor offenses (assault, interference with 
an officer making an arrest, domestic violence in the presence of a child, and intoxica-
tion). (R. 3-6.) After a preliminary hearing in the matter, on January 10, 2003, McArthur 
entered a guilty plea for two counts of threatening with or using a dangerous weapon in a 
fight or quarrel, class A misdemeanor offenses under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506 
(1999). (R. 35-42.) The remaining charges were dismissed. (See R. 68.) On February 
21, 2003, the trial judge entered judgment in the case. (R. 50-51; Addendum A, hereto.) 
On March 21, 2003, McArthur filed a motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. (R. 53-
57.) On April 14, 2003, the trial court denied the motion. A copy of the trial court's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order is attached hereto as Addendum C. 
(R. 67-69.) McArthur has timely appealed from the final order. (R. 70-71 (Notice of 
3 
Appeal, dated April 30, 2003).)1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The state charged McArthur with six crimes as a result of conduct allegedly occur-
ring on October 26 and 27,2002. (R. 3-6.) McArthur pleaded guilty to two offenses. He 
maintains on appeal that an insufficient factual basis exists for the pleas (see Argument). 
At a preliminary hearing, state witnesses testified as follows. On October 26, 
McArthur tended Sherile Fernandez's children, including 4-year-old Monica, during the 
evening. Sherile is McArthur's daughter and Monica is his granddaughter. (See R. 5; 91: 
5-6.) When Sherile returned home, she and Monica drove McArthur to 309 North 1000 
West, where he lived with his mother Afton and his sister Laura Kendall. (R. 91:6-7.) 
When Sherile and McArthur arrived at McArthur's house, he stated he wanted to 
take Monica for the night; Sherile refused. (R. 91:7.) She noticed McArthur had been 
drinking and did not want Monica to stay with him. (R. 91:7-8.) McArthur became 
belligerent and rude. He and Sherile argued. (R. 91:8.) McArthur struck Sherile several 
1 On May 12, 2003, McArthur filed a "Motion for Amended Sentence, Judgment, 
Commitment." (R. 80-81.) The state stipulated to the motion and the trial court granted 
it. (R. 82-83.) The motion was filed more than 2 months after the trial court executed the 
original "Sentence, Judgment, Commitment." (SeeR. 50-51 (dated February 21, 2003).) 
It had no effect on the time for filing the notice of appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 4(b) 
(2003) (providing that the following, timely motions will toll the time for filing a notice 
of appeal: a motion under Utah R. Civ. P. 50(b), filed not later than 10 days after 
judgment; a motion under Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b), filed not later than 10 days after 
judgment; a motion under Utah R. Civ, P. 59, filed not later than 10 days after judgment; 
a motion under Utah R. Crim. P. 24, filed within 10 days of the imposition of sentence; 
and a motion under statutory law to withdraw a guilty plea). 
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times on the right side of the face in front of Monica. (R. 5; 91:8.) 
McArthur then stepped out of Sherile's car and got into the back of the car through 
Monica's door. (R. 91:9.) When Sherile tried to stop McArthur, he threw her to the 
ground. (R. 91:9.) At that point, Afton and Laura Kendall came outside the house (R. 
91:9-10), and Sherile went inside to call 9-1-1. (R. 91:10.) Sherile stepped back outside 
and McArthur hit her again on the side of the head with his fist (R. 91:10). McArthur 
then ran away. Sherile did not see McArthur again. (R. 91:10-11.) 
Laura Kendall testified that she saw McArthur hit Sherile. (R. 91:21-22.) When 
police arrived, McArthur was not there. Police left, and Laura and Afton went inside the 
house and locked the doors. (R. 91:22-23.) When McArthur returned to the house, Laura 
and Afton refused to unlock the doors. (R. 91:23.) McArthur went to the basement and 
kicked through a window and unlatched the door. (R. 91:23, 29.) McArthur then walked 
into the kitchen and got a 10-inch knife to open an aspirin bottle. (R. 91:24.) 
As McArthur struggled to get the bottle opened, he walked into the living room 
with the knife. He told Laura and Afton he was going to shut off the lights. (R. 91:24.) 
As McArthur said that, he raised his fist with the knife, but did not point it toward anyone 
in particular. (R. 91:24-25; but see 91:31 (Laura believed McArthur pointed the knife 
toward Afton when he turned off the lights, but was not sure).) McArthur turned off the 
porch lights and television, and he sat in a chair. He did not say anything. He did not 
threaten Afton or Laura. (R. 91:25.) He sat down and stood up repeatedly. (R. 91:25.) 
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At some point, a police officer arrived at the house. As Laura and Afton walked 
out the door, the officer walked in. (R. 91:26.) 
Officer Evans testified that he walked into the living room, saw McArthur and 
drew his weapon. (R. 91:35.) McArthur dropped the knife and Evans ordered McArthur 
to the ground. McArthur asked the officer to shoot him. Evans testified that he "didn't 
think that was a wise idea," so he sprayed pepper spray in McArthur's face. (R. 91:35.) 
McArthur screamed in pain and rolled on the ground making it difficult for Evans to 
handcuff him. (R. 91:36.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge bound McArthur 
over on charges of aggravated assault (two counts), simple assault, committing domestic 
violence in the presence of a child, and intoxication. (See R. 91:45.) 
On January 10, 2003, McArthur entered guilty pleas for two counts of threatening 
with or using a dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel, class A misdemeanor offenses 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506 (1999). (R. 35-42.) The state dismissed the charges 
for assaulting Sherile, for domestic violence in front of Monica, and for intoxication. 
(See R. 45-46; 68.) 
On February 21, 2003, the trial court sentenced McArthur to consecutive one-year 
terms at an adult correctional facility. (R. 50-51; 82-83.) On March 21,2003, McArthur 
moved to withdraw the guilty pleas. (R. 53-57.) The trial court denied McArthur's 
motion and this appeal followed. (R. 67-71.) 
Additional facts relating to the arguments raised on appeal are set forth below. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The trial court failed to comply with Rule 11(e) in taking the guilty pleas in this 
case. Rule 11(e) provides that the trial court may not accept a guilty plea unless it has 
found that defendant knew of the right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury and that 
defendant intended to waive that right. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(3) (2003). In this case, the 
trial court did not make that determination. Failure to comply with Rule 11(e) constitutes 
plain and obvious error. See Dean, 2002 UTApp 323. McArthur respectfully asks this 
Court to vacate the guilty pleas and to remand the case for further proceedings. 
In addition, Rule 11(e) provides that before a trial court may accept a guilty plea, it 
must find that defendant understood the nature and elements "of the offense to which the 
plea is entered," and it must find "a factual basis" for the plea. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4) 
(A) & (B) (2003). The Utah Supreme Court has specified that those provisions require a 
trial court to ensure that defendant understands the nature/elements of the offense in 
relation to the facts. See State v Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309, 1312-13 (Utah 1987). The 
court will determine whether defendant pleaded guilty to facts "sufficient to support the 
offense." State v. Thurman. 911 P.2d 371, 373 (Utah 1996). In this case, the facts of 
record fail to support two separate counts of threatening with or using a dangerous 
weapon in a fight or quarrel. Specifically, the record is insufficient for the second 
conviction. Thus, under the plain-error analysis, the plea proceedings were improper. 
7 
ARGUMENTS 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF RULE life) IN OBTAINING THE GUILTY 
PLEAS. 
Pursuant to Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial court may not 
accept a guilty plea from the defendant until the court "has found" that defendant has 
voluntarily made the plea; the defendant knows of certain, specified, constitutional rights, 
and he knows that by entering the guilty plea he is waiving those rights; the defendant 
understands the nature and the elements of the offense to which the plea is entered; and 
there is a factual basis for the plea. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) (2003). The trial court must 
comply strictly with the requirements set forth in Rule 11(e) before accepting a guilty plea 
from the defendant. See State v. Corwell 2003 UT App 261, [^12, 478 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 
petition for cert filed (August 18, 2003) (citing Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312; State v. 
Abeyta. 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993); Dean. 2002 UT App 323, ^ [10 n.2; State v. 
Visser, 2000 UT 88, ffl[10-l 1, 22 P.3d 1242; and Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)). 
In order to comport with Rule 11(e) requirements, the trial court may engage in a 
plea colloquy with the defendant on the record, and/or use a "written statement reciting 
[the factors set forth in Rule 11(e)] after the court has established that the defendant has 
read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement." Utah R. Crim. P. 
11(e)(8); State v. Mills. 898 P.2d 819, 823 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (noting that to 
properly incorporate an affidavit, the trial judge must ascertain that defendant has read, 
8 
understood, and acknowledged all the information contained therein). In this case, 
although McArthur signed a statement, the trial court did not incorporate it into the 
colloquy for the plea as required by the rule.2 Thus, the statement is irrelevant as further 
explained below. See infra, subpart A., herein. 
In addition, in proceeding with the colloquy on the record, the trial court failed to 
advise McArthur of the right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury; the court failed to 
ascertain that it was McArthur's choice to waive that right; and the court failed to deter-
mine whether McArthur had any understanding of the elements to which he entered the 
guilty pleas and their relationship to the facts in this case. Those matters are further 
discussed below. See infra, subparts B., and C, herein. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY INCORPORATE THE 
STATEMENT INTO THE PLEA COLLOQUY. 
Utah law allows a trial judge to rely on a "written statement" or affidavit in ful-
filling the requirements set forth at Rule 11(e). See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(8) (2003). 
However, before the trial court may look to the "written statement," the court must estab-
lish "that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the state-
ment." Id. The language of Rule 11(e)(8) serves to ensure that the trial court is taking a 
2 The record from the plea proceedings does not indicate whether McArthur read the 
statement before signing it. According to the record, McArthur appeared in open court 
and answered questions from the judge about certain constitutional rights. (R. 92:5-7.) 
After the judge engaged in a partial colloquy, the judge then instructed McArthur to sign 
the statement, which he did. (R. 92:7.) 
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knowing and voluntary plea. That is, before a defendant is asked to waive important 
constitutional rights associated with entering a guilty plea, the court must establish that 
defendant is waiving those rights by his choosing. 
"What is at stake for an accused facing [punishment] demands the utmost 
solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make 
sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence." 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312 (cite omitted); see id at 1313-1314 (identifying the 
information that the affidavit should contain, and specifying that the "trial judge should 
then review the statements in the affidavit with the defendant, question the defendant 
concerning his understanding of it, and fulfill the other requirements imposed by § 77-35-
11 [superceded by Rule 11(e)] on the record before accepting the guilty plea"). 
In this case, the record contains a plea statement setting forth information required 
by Rule 11(e) and Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313-1314.3 A copy of the statement is attached 
hereto as Addendum D. The statement asserts that McArthur was advised of and 
3 Under Gibbons, an affidavit or written statement should contain the information 
required by Rule 11(e). Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313. Such an affidavit serves as a starting 
place for the colloquy. Id, To ensure the trial judge has made "the constitutionally 
required determination that the defendant's plea is truly knowing and voluntary," id at 
1314, the judge is required under the constitutional standard in Gibbons to "review the 
statements in the affidavit with the defendant, question the defendant concerning his 
understanding of it, and fulfill the other requirements" imposed by Rule 11(e) before 
accepting the plea. Id If the trial court were to rely only on the affidavit to fulfill the rule 
requirements, that would be improper; it would amount to a plea from defendant's lawyer. 
Under Gibbons and U.S. Supreme Court precedent, such a plea would be unconstitu-
tional. See id at 1313 (citing Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 650 (1976)). 
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understood that he was pleading to two counts of threatening with or using a dangerous 
weapon in a fight or quarrel. (R. 35.) It identified the degree of the offenses, and the 
maximum punishments. (Id.) 
The statement included a "waiver of constitutional rights/' and identified the right 
"to a speedy and public trial by an impartial (unbiased) jury/' the right to confront/cross-
examine witnesses, the right to compel witnesses, the right to testify and the privilege 
against self-incrimination, the presumption of innocence and the state's burden of proof, 
and the right to appeal. (R. 36-38.) The statement specified the potential penalties and 
relevant plea bargains, and that McArthur was entering the pleas freely, voluntarily, 
knowingly, and without coercion, threats, or unlawful influence. (R. 38-39.) 
The record in this case supports that the trial court opted not to use the written 
statement/affidavit as a basis for fulfilling the requirements set forth at Rule 11(e). Speci-
fically, at the plea hearing the trial court did not ascertain or "establish[]" whether 
defendant had "read, understood and acknowledged the contents of the statement." See 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(8). A copy of the transcript for the plea hearing is attached hereto 
as Addendum E. Rather, the court simply asked both defense counsel and defendant 
whether they had "gone over" the statement, and whether McArthur understood it or had 
questions about it. (R. 92:3-6.) That is insufficient. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(8). 
"When an affidavit is used to evidence defendant's knowledge and willingness to 
plead guilty, the trial court's examination of defendant regarding the affidavit's contents 
11 
should be sufficiently detailed and extensive to provide a factual basis to conclude from 
defendant's responses that his decision was knowing and voluntary." State v. Valencia. 
776 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (emphasis added). 
Stated another way, if the trial judge had intended to rely on the statement to fulfill 
any part of the Rule 11(e) colloquy, the trial judge should have taken measures to ascer-
tain on the record what was set forth in the statement, what defendant reviewed with his 
attorney, and the extent to which defendant comprehended and acknowledged those 
provisions of the statement that he reviewed. While such a procedure would have taken 
additional time, that is inconsequential. "[Constitutional rights may not be sacrificed in 
the name of judicial economy." Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1314. On this record, the judge did 
not examine Mc Arthur about the rights contained in the statement. (See R. 92.) The judge 
did not engage in a detailed, extensive examination of the statement to ensure that it con-
stituted a knowing, voluntary guilty plea to the offenses. See Valencia, 776 P.2d at 1335. 
Thus, in determining whether the trial court complied with Rule 11(e) in this case, 
the statement is irrelevant. See State v. Ostler. 2000 UT App 28, ^ {20, 996 P.2d 1065 
(although the video tape generally discussed the constitutional and other requirements set 
forth in Rule 11(e), the trial court failed to make any effort to determine defendant's 
particular understanding of the tape, rendering the tape useless "even as a preliminary 
foundation for Rule 11(e) compliance"), affd. 2001 UT 68, 31 P.3d 528; Valencia. 776 
P.2d at 1335; also Martinez. 2001 UT 12, %5 (trial court questioned defendant about 
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affidavit; defendant "understood the terms and conditions of the affidavit and plea 
agreement"; he also "acknowledged to the court that he read and discussed the affidavit 
with counsel and he still wished to enter into the plea agreement"). 
The record in this case supports that the trial judge intended to accept the guilty 
pleas based only on the court's questioning of the defendant on the record. See Utah R. 
Crim. P. 11(e)(8); see also Addendum E, hereto. Thus, this Court should look only to 
the colloquy to determine whether the trial court met the requirements of Rule 11(e). 
Under that analysis, the trial court did not comply with the rule, as further explained. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER MCARTHUR 
INTENDED TO KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO 
A SPEEDY TRIAL BEFORE AN IMPARTIAL JURY. 
Here, the trial court engaged in only a partial Rule 11(e) colloquy. During the 
questioning of the defendant on the record, the court did not ascertain (among other 
things) whether McArthur knowingly and voluntarily intended to waive his right to a 
speedy trial before an impartial jury. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(3); (see R. 92). On that 
basis, the plea is insufficient. The record contains a plain and obvious error under the law. 
To explain, in State v. Dean, 2002 UT App 323, defendant pleaded guilty to a 
felony count of child abuse and two misdemeanor offenses. Id at fl . Prior to sentencing, 
he moved to withdraw the pleas and the trial court denied the motion. Id at %2. Dean 
appealed and argued for the first time that the trial court committed plain error because it 
failed to advise him of his right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury. Id at ^ [3. This 
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Court agreed. It ruled that the trial court's failure to advise Dean of those rights, "dealt 
with a substantial constitutional right." Id. at ^ [12 (cite omitted). This Court presumed 
harm as a result of the omission in the colloquy and reversed the trial court's ruling on the 
motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. Id, cert granted. 64 P.3d 586 (Utah 2003). This 
Court issued its ruling in Dean three months before the trial court engaged in the plea 
colloquy with McArthur. 
Next, this Court's ruling in State v. Corwell 2003 UT App 261, is consistent with 
Dean. There, the defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of attempted evidence tampering. 
Id. at ^ fl. In connection with the plea colloquy, the trial court advised Corwell that by 
pleading guilty, she was giving up her right to a trial before an impartial jury "and that her 
trial was scheduled for the following Monday." IcL at ^ [7. The judge did not use the word 
"speedy" in the colloquy, and the plea statement did not contain that word. Id. 
When Corwell later moved to withdraw the guilty plea, the trial court denied the 
motion. Corwell appealed. See icl at ffl|8-9. She argued that the "trial court failed to 
strictly comply with rule 1 lfs requirements that she be informed of her right to a speedy 
trial and that her guilty plea would limit her right to appeal." Id. at ^  11 (cite omitted). 
In considering the matter in Corwell, this Court looked to the circumstances of the 
case to determine whether the defendant had been apprised of her speedy trial right. Id. at 
1J15. It recognized that trial was set for the following Monday. That fact did not relieve 
the trial court of advising defendant that she was waiving her right to a speedy trial. 
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"Modern trial practice is replete with opportunities for delay, postponement, or 
continuance. Without more, the mere mention of an imminent trial date is not sufficient 
to satisfy rule 1 lfs requirement that a defendant be apprised of the right to a speedy trial." 
IdL at ^ [15. This Court found the trial court's colloquy to be incomplete. 
Also, it reiterated the following: "'It is not sufficient to assume that defense 
attorneys make sure that their clients fully understand the contents of the affidavit.' 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313. The duty to ensure that defendants know and understand the 
rights they are surrendering when pleading guilty rests not on the parties, but on the trial 
court. See id at 1312." CorwelL 2003 UT 261, [^18: see State v. TarnawieckL 2000 UT 
App 186, TJ18, 5 P.3d 1222 (the trial court's failure to advise the defendant of her 
constitutional right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury constituted obvious error). 
The Plain and Obvious Error Here. In McArthur's case, the trial court committed 
plain and obvious error when it failed to ascertain during the plea colloquy whether 
McArthur intended to waive his right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury. See 
Dean, 2002 UT App 323. 
First, under established law, the trial court was required to comply strictly with 
Rule 11(e). See Corwell 2003 UT 261, [^18 (rule 11 compliance is not the province of 
defense counsel). While compliance may be accomplished by multiple means, Utah 
courts have expressed a preference for a colloquy on the record, see Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 
1313-14, and the courts have placed limits on the use of a statement. Id Specifically, a 
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trial court may rely on a written statement to fulfill the requirements of Rule 11(e) if the 
court has established "that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the 
contents of the statement." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(8). "[W]hen plea affidavits are pro-
perly incorporated in the record (as when the trial judge ascertains in the plea colloquy 
that the defendant has read, has understood, and acknowledges all the information con-
tained therein), they may properly form a part of the basis for finding rule 11 compli-
ance." Mills, 898 P.2d at 823 n. 4 (quoting State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216 (Utah 1991)). 
Stated another way, if the trial court intends to rely on a written statement to fulfill 
Rule 11(e) requirements, it must engage in a sufficiently detailed and extensive exami-
nation of the rights contained in the statement to ensure the guilty plea is a knowing and 
voluntary decision of the defendant. See Valencia, 776 P.2d at 1335; Gibbons, 740 P.2d 
at 1313. The trial court must ensure on the record that defendant is properly informed of 
his rights and that he has chosen to waive those rights. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1314. 
Here, although the written statement identified defendant's "right to a speedy and 
public trial by an impartial (unbiased) jury" and a waiver thereof (R. 37), the trial judge 
did not discuss those rights with McArthur to ensure that he understood them and 
intended to waive them. The court did not engage in a detailed or extensive examination 
of the statement or the rights contained in the statement. (See R. 92, generally); see also 
supra, subpart A., herein; Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312-13; Valencia, 776 P.2d at 1335. 
Instead, during a colloquy on the record, the trial judge asked whether defense 
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counsel had "gone over" the statement with McA * - ' 2 : 3 . ) Both McArthur and his 
counsel answered in the affirmative. (R. 92:3-6.) McArthur also stated that he 
understood the statement and he had no questions. (R. 92:5-6.) Thereafter, the trial court 
informed McArthur that he was waiving certain constitutional rights: 
Including the right to [be] tried by a jury of eight people, the right to require the 
State to prove their case against you beyond a reasonable doubt to the unanimous 
satisfaction of a jury of eight people, the right to confront and cross examine 
witnesses produced by the State against you, the right to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in your own behalf at no cost to you, the right to take the stand and 
testify in your own behalf, if you choose, or remain silent during the trial, if you 
choose, and the right to appeal in the event a jury finds you guilty of the charges at 
a trial, as well as the right to be presumed innocent until you're found guilty if you 
are, all of which rights, as well as the others contained on that statement that we 
may not have discussed you're waiving by the entry of a guilty plea. Do you 
understand that? 
(R. 92:6-7.) McArthur answered "Yes, sir, I do." (R. 92:7.) McArthur then signed the 
written statement and counsel provided it to the trial judge. (Id.; see supra, note 2, herein.) 
The trial judge in this matter did not advise McArthur during the colloquy of his 
right to a "speedy" trial before an impartial jury. (R. 92.) Rule 11(e) requires a judge to 
inform a defendant of that right, and to ascertain that by his plea defendant intends to 
waive that right. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e); Dean. 2002 UT App 323; CorwelL 2003 Ur 
261. Whi 1c R iik I Uv) docs n<»( require "a particular script or rote recitation of the rights 
listed" therein (CorwelL 2003 UT App 261, f^ 13 (cite omitted)), the trial court must make 
certain that "no requirement of the rule is omitted" in taking a plea: the defendant must be 
informed of the speedy trial right before an impartial jury, Id, 1 he court's failure here to 
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advise McArthur of that right is obvious error. Dean, 2002 UT App 323, «J12. 
Also, for the reasons stated above (supra, subpart A., herein), the written statement 
here does not support compliance with Rule 11(e); the judge did not "properly 
incorporate[]" the statement into the plea proceedings. See Mills, 898 P.2d at 823 n.4. 
The trial judge did not examine McArthur about constitutional rights identified in the 
statement; the judge did not ascertain which parts of the statement McArthur read or the 
level of his understanding; and the judge did not ask McArthur to acknowledge any rights 
contained in the statement. (See R. 92); Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(8). 
Where the trial court made no "effort to determine the circumstances under which 
[this] particular defendant" reviewed the statement "or his or her level of understanding 
thereof," Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, ^ [20, the record concerning the statement "fails to 
satisfy the trial court's responsibility of ensuring on the record that a defendant's guilty 
plea is knowing and voluntary in accordance with the requirements of Rule 11(e)," and it 
renders the statement "virtually useless even as a preliminary foundation for Rule 11(e) 
compliance." Id.; see Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1314; also supra, note 3, herein. 
In this case, the record of the plea proceedings fails to support that McArthur had 
notice of his constitutional right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury and that he 
knowingly waived that right. The trial court committed plain/obvious error in failing to 
comply with Rule 11(e) in the plea proceedings. See Dean, 2002 UT App 323,1fl|10-12. 
The Prejudice Here. Next, the trial court's error was harmful. This Court ruled in 
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Dean and Corwell that failure to strictly comply with Rule 11(e) in advising defendant of 
his right to a speed) trial before an impartial jury constituted prejudicial error. 
Finally, the trial court's omission was harmful because the omission dealt 
with a substantial constitutional right. It is well established under Utah law 
that we will presume harm under plain error analysis when a trial court fails 
to inform a defendant of his constitutional rights under rule 11. See, e.g., 
TarnawieckU 5 P.3d 1222, 2000 UT App 186 at [^18 (presuming harm 
when trial court failed to inform Defendant that she was entitled to a 
"speedy trial before an impartial jury"); State v. Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, 
^[25-26, 996 P.2d 1065 (presuming harm where trial court failed to inform 
defendant that he would waive certain constitutional rights by pleading 
guilty) 
Hittle, 2002 UT App 134 at ^ [9,47 P.3d 101 (first citation omitted). Accordingly, 
the trial court committed plain error by failing to advise Dean of his right to a 
speedy trial before an impartial jury. 
Dean. 2002 UT App 323, f 12 (note omitted); see. also Corwell. 2003 UT App 261, TJ19; 
Ostler. 2000 UT App 28, ^ 25 (where the court failed to advise defendant, among other 
things, of his constitutional rights and that he was waiving those rights, defendant was 
not fully informed at the time of the plea, rendering the plea in v oh mtary). 
Under the plain-error analysis, McArthur respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the trial court's ruling on the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO 
EXPLAIN THE LEGAL ELEMENTS IN RELATION TO THE FACTS FOR 
THE GUILTY PLEAS AND WHEN IT FAILED TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER 
MCARTHUR UNDERSTOOD THE RELATIONSHIP. THE COURT ALSO 
COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO ASCERTAIN A 
FACTUAL BASIS FOR EACH GUILTY PLEA. 
1. The Trial Court Did Not Discuss the Elements of Both Offenses in Relation to 
the Facts of the Case: Instead, the Court Relied on One Set of Facts to Support a 
Guilty Plea for Both Counts. That Was Improper. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has specified that to make a knowing guilty plea, the 
defendant must "understand the elements of the crimes charged and the relationship of the 
law to the facts." Gibbons. 740 P.2d at 1312. "This is the requirement of Rule 11(e)(4)." 
Mills. 898 P.2d at 824; see also Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4) (2003). 
A defendant's "understanding of the elements of the charges and the relationship 
of the law and the facts may not be presumed from a silent or incomplete examination." 
Valencia. 776 P.2d at 1335. "[T]he factual elements of the charges against the defendant 
must be explained in the taking of a guilty plea so that the defendant understands and 
admits those elements: [4]Because a guilty plea is an admission of all of the elements of a 
formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an 
understanding of the law in relation to the facts.[']" Gibbons. 740 P.2d at 1313 (citing 
McCarthy v. U.S.. 394 U.S. 459 (1969)). 
In Martinez. 2001 UT 12, the prosecutor articulated facts on the record supporting 
a plea for murder, where defendant shook 3-year-old Orlando Chacon, and the child died 
of the injuries. Id. at <[fl|2, 4. The defendant acknowledged that he committed an act en-
dangering the child's life, he intended to cause serious bodily injury, he violently shook 
the child intentionally/knowingly, and he caused the child's death. Id at ^ [6. Based on 
the record, the supreme court ruled that the plea proceedings were sufficient. Id at |^25. 
In State v. Thurman. 911 P.2d 371 (Utah 1996), defendant pleaded guilty to 
aggravated murder in exchange for the state's promise to not seek the death penalty and to 
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dismiss other charges against him. Id. at 372. Thurman later moved to withdraw I he 
guilty plea, and the trial court denied the motion. Id. On ... • i v.; •. the Utah Supreme Court 
considered "the elements of the offense for which Thurman was charged, aggravated 
murder by means of a bomb," and "whether the record demonstrate^] that Thurman 
understood these elements and knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty to facts 
sufficient to support the offense." Id. at 373. 
The court recognized that in the plea affidavit, Thurman acknowledged the 
elements of aggravated murder, where the actor "intentionally or knowingly causes the 
death of another by means of a bomb hidden or concealed in a place and he | sit | his iit ( 
would create a great risk of tliMilli - - . uie. id. a u /**. 
With respect to whether Thurman pleaded guilty to facts sufficient to support the 
offense, the court considered the following: 
Thurman stated his conduct which he believed constituted the elements of 
aggravated murder by means of a bomb: 
Prior to May 15, 1991, in Salt Lake County, Utah, I placed a bomb I had 
constructed in Howard Cook!s Landcruiser. It was not my intention to kill Adam 
Cook. However, I knew the bomb could cause death and I knew that by 
concealing it I had created a great risk of death to anyone in that vehicle. 
Thurman, 911 P.2d at 374. I he court also recognized that during examination on the 
record Thin mail maintained that he did not intend to kill Adam Cook, but that he knew 
the bomb could cause death. IcL at 374-75. And the court found it relevant that the 
parties and the trial judge were generally confused concerning the proper mental state for 
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the offense. Id. at 375. 
Based on that record, the supreme court ruled that "Thurman failed to admit facts 
sufficient to support an aggravated murder conviction and that the record, as a whole, 
fail[ed] to demonstrate that Thurman fully comprehended the nature and elements of the 
offense to which he pleaded guilty." Id. at 375; id n.4 (the court refused to make 
inferences about the plea; it focused only on the "facts Thurman admitted" in plea 
proceedings, "as opposed to the facts he failed to deny"). 
In State v. Breckenridge. 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983), the defendant was charged 
with aggravated arson and he pleaded guilty to the lesser charge of arson. Id_ at 441-42. 
During the plea colloquy, the trial court identified the elements for arson and asked the 
defendant whether he understood the elements and whether he understood that he was 
pleading guilty to the elements. The defendant answered yes. Thereafter, the defendant 
related the facts purportedly supporting the crime. Id. at 442. The defendant explained 
that while at work, he decided to bum old car and service parts to get rid of them. After 
defendant started the fire, he could not get it out and it burned the building roof. Based 
on that description of the facts, the trial court accepted the guilty plea. Id. 
Thereafter, at sentencing, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea. Id_ He 
again described the fire as accidental and argued that he was improperly influenced to 
plead guilty by stories of sexual and physical abuse in prison. Id. Defendant also argued 
that "the prosecutor misrepresented to him the existence of an eyewitness, and that the 
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prosecutor failed to expose exculpatory evidence." Id. (note omitted). I he trial court 
denied the motion, and defendant appealed. Id. at 442-43. ] during oral argument in 1:1 le 
supreme court, the defendant "addressed for the first t ime the argument that his right to 
due process was violated because his guilty plea was accepted by the court without his 
understanding the nature and elements of arson and without any showing that there was 
any factual basis upoi i vvl lich to base a coi i\ iction of the ci ime "" I d . at 443. 
Due to the importance of the issue at stake, the supreme court addressed 
defendant 's newly raised argument. The supreme court found that the trial court failed to 
comply with Rule 11(e). 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4) specifically states that "the court . . . . shall not accept. . . . a 
plea [of guilty] until the court has made the findings:.. . . (4) That the defendant 
understands the nature and elements of the offense to which he is entering the 
plea." N o such finding was explicitly made in this case, and indeed could not have 
been correctly made based on the defendant's statements to the prosecutor and the 
court at the t ime the plea was entered. 
Breckenridge, 688 P.2d at 443. The record failed to recite a "factual basis from which 
we might c •oncli ide that arson ever occurred '"" Id. • • 
The court specified that the trial court "'has an undoubted duty to guard against 
the possibility that an accused who is innocent of the crime charged may be induced to 
plead guilty without sufficient understanding of the nat uiv of the charge in (lie 
consequences of his plea ....'" Id_ at 443 (cite omitted). It noted that trial courts must 
protect against situations where the defendant has misunderstood the nature of the crime 
against him. "'A person may well know what he has done but not be sufficiently skilled 
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in law to recognize that his acts do not constitute the offense with which he is charged/,f 
Id. at 443 n.2 (cite omitted). For example, a defendant should not be allowed to plead 
guilty to "mailing obscene material until the court has examined the material to determine 
that it is in fact obscene." Id (cite omitted); see also Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, Tf 14 
(ruling that the trial court failed to explain the nature and elements of the offense and to 
find a factual basis for the plea). The supreme court vacated Breckenridge's guilty plea. 
The Plain and Obvious Error Here. In this case, McArthur pleaded guilty to two 
counts of "threatening with or using [a] dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel." The 
statute identifies the elements for that offense as follows: 
Every person, except those persons described in Section 76-10-503, who, not in 
necessary self defense in the presence of two or more persons, draws or exhibits 
any dangerous weapon in an angry and threatening manner or unlawfully uses the 
same in any fight or quarrel is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506 (1999). 
Utah courts have ruled that this offense may be established with proof that defen-
dant pointed "a gun (a dangerous or deadly weapon)" at two officers in an angry and 
threatening way. State v. Oldrovd. 685 P.2d 551, 553, 554 (Utah 1984). However, if 
defendant was not involved in a fight or quarrel when he exhibited the dangerous weapon, 
the provision may not apply. See State v. Parra. 972 P.2d 924, 928 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Where McArthur pleaded guilty to two counts of the offense, the trial court was 
required to ascertain whether McArthur understood the nature and elements of both 
charges in relation to the facts of the case. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312-13; Utah R. Crim. 
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P. 11(e)(4)(A). In this case, the trial court accepted the guilty pleas on both counts 
without making that assessment. That is, McA i thui failed to admit facts sufficien ' 
support two convictions. In that regard, the plea proceedings were plainly defective. See 
Thurman. 911 P.2d at 375; Breckenridge. 688 P.2d at 443-44; Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4). 
Consider the record here. The written statement contained the following: "The 
elements of the crime(s) to which 1 am pleading guilty (or no contest) are: Every person 
who, not in necessary self defense in the presence of two or more persons, draws or 
exhibits any dangerous weapon in an angry and threatening manner or unlawfully uses the 
same in any fight or quarrel." (R. 36.) It also stated, "On October 26,2002, at 309 North 
! 0(10 West., Salt I ,akc County, I twice exhibited a knife in a threatening manner in the 
presence of two persons." (R. 36.) The description of the offenses was couched in terms 
of the statutory language without setting forth the nature of each charge in relation to the 
facts. See Thurman, 911 P.2d at 374 (recognizing that plea affidavit set forth the 
elements; proceedings ne\ ertheless were inadequate). 
On the record during the colloquy, the trial court described the offenses as follows: 
THE COURT:.. . Mr. McArthur, you understand by having signed this statement 
you are [admitting as] true and correct the following facts and elements involved 
in two separate counts of threatening with or using a dangerous weapon in a fight 
or quarrel, specifically that on or about the 26th of October [2002] through the 27th 
of October [2002], at the location of 309 North 1000 West in Salt Lake County, 
you, according to the offense, did not in self defense draw or exhibit a dangerous 
weapon in an angry or threatening manner or unlawfully used the same in a fight 
or quarrel. Those facts and elements are true and correct, are they not, sir? 
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
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THE COURT: This same conduct, which is constituted as a threat of a dangerous -
use of a dangerous weapon in a fight occurred at the same location, 309 North, 
1000 West during the same timeframe, the 26th/27th October on two different 
occasions. 
MS. REMAL: It was during one incident, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, there's two different charges. 
MS. REMAL: Right. 
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes. 
THE COURT: So someone has been able to find that there were two separate 
incidences going on here, even though it may have been part of the same larger 
fight, right? You're prepared to plead to two separate charges -
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, there -
THE COURT: - involving the use of threatening use of a dangerous weapon. 
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Those facts and elements as they relate to the use of dangerous 
weapons, specifically a knife, did occur during the time frame as indicated at the 
location stated; is that right, sir? 
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that those facts and elements constitute two 
separate class A misdemeanor crimes for which you could be sentenced by this 
Court for a period of up to one year in the Adult Detention Center and fined a sum 
of $2500 plus a surcharge. That's clear to you; is it not? 
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
(R. 92:7-9 (emphasis added.)) The trial court here failed to discuss the nature and the 
elements of the two separate charges in relation to the facts of this case. (See R. 92.) 
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Specifically, \\ here I he crime of "threatening with or using [a] dangerous weapon 
in a fight or quarrel" requires the state to prove that defendant exhibited a dangerous 
weapon "in the presence of two or more persons " Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506 
(emphasis added), the trial judge in this case did not mention that necessary element 
during the plea colloquy. (See R. 92); State v. Mason, 726 P.2d 772, 781 (Idaho 1986) 
(considering a similar statute, the Idaho court stated that the crime "is not committed 
unless the exhibition occurs in the presence of two (2) or more persons.' Thus the 
presence of two or more persons is an essential element of the crime"). Thus, the guilty 
pleas cannot be know inp, nnd voluntary. See Thurman, 9 * **.2d at 374-75. 
In addition, there was no discussion of the elemen facts for each 
separate offense. For example, for each separate count, how did McArthur purportedly 
exhibit a dangerous weapon in an angry and threatening manner and/or in a fight, and 
who were the "two oi more persons" for each count? (See R. 92; 36 (stating only that on 
October 26, 2002, at 309 North 1000 West, "I twice exhibited a knife in a threatening 
manner in the presence of two persons").) Significantly, the prosecutor offered no theory 
for the double charges under § 76-10-506, and no explanation of how the separate crimes 
were accomplished or how the separate charges related I he facts of the case. (R. 92.) 
Assuming arguendo the "two or more persons" here were Afton and I anni 
McArthur's admissions and the record support only one offense, where McArthur had a 
knife in his hand in the presence of Afton and Laura at one location during one specific 
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"time frame." (R. 92:8 (in identifying the second count, the court referred to "the same 
conduct" as the first count and the same "time frame").) See People v. HalL 83 Cal. App. 
4th 1084, 1096, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 279, 288 (Cal. App. 2000) (considering the provisions 
of a similar California statute, and ruling that the single act of exhibiting a firearm in the 
presence of a peace officer "cannot be punished as many times as there are peace officers 
observing the act"); Oldroyd, 685 P.2d at 553, 554 (ruling that officer's testimony that 
defendant pointed a gun when two officers approached the stairwell supported an instruc-
tion on the crime of exhibiting a dangerous weapon); Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1999). 
Indeed, after the judge engaged in the limited discussion of the first charge with 
McArthur, the judge used the same facts to discuss the second charge, asserting that the 
"use of a dangerous weapon in a fight occurred" at the same location during the same 
time frame, "on two different occasions." (R. 92:8.) That is insufficient to constitute two 
separate offenses. The judge did not identify a factual basis for the second count; he 
made no attempt to distinguish it in any way from the first count. (R. 92:8-9.) 
At that point, counsel for McArthur informed the court that the facts described for 
both counts occurred "during one incident, your Honor." (R. 92:8.) Counsel agreed there 
were two charges, and the judge then stated that "someone has been able to find that there 
were two separate incidences going on here, even though it may have been part of the 
same larger fight, right?" (R. 92:8 (emphasis added).) Without waiting for an answer and 
without exploring the nature of the two separate charges, the judge then asked McArthur 
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to plead to the counts, which he did. (R, 92:8-9.) 
Under established law, the "someone" responsible ioi ensuring that a separate 
factual basis existed for each separate count was the judge. "The court has an undoubted 
duty to guard against the possibility that an accused who is innocent of the crime charged 
may be induced to plead guilty without sufficient understanding of the nature of the 
charge or the consequences of his plea.'" Breckenridge. 688 P.2d at 443 (cite omitted). 
Rather than inquire into the factual basis for and the nature of the two separate 
charges, and rather than ascertain the relation of the separate offenses to the facts of the 
case, Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312, the judge proceeded with the plea, K *•'. >-v ° hat 
was improper. 1 his record supports that tl le ji idge accepted w< - ^ ftv pleas for ,* >•••-ngle 
incident. Although McArthur affirmed that he was pleading to two separate counts (id.), 
it is apparent from this record that he was not advised of and he misunderstood the legal 
elements in relation to the facts. He was not "sufficiently skilled in [the] law to recog-
nize •! - • * (Breckenridge, 688 P.2d at 443 n 2) did not suppor t tvs o convictions. 
Also, since the trial court did not mention during the colloquy that one count of 
exhibiting a dangerous weapon occurs in the presence of two or more persons (see R. 92), 
McArthur did not have the opportunity to understand the lutim: ol lite elements in rela-
tion to this case or to explain to the judge how his conduct constituted only one crime. 
See Hall 83 Cal. App. 4th at 1095-96, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 288 (finding a single act of ex-
hibiting a firearm in the presence of more than one officer). Thus, the guilty pleas here 
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were accepted by the trial court without defendant understanding the nature/elements of 
the two separate charges in relation to the facts. That constitutes plain and obvious error. 
See Breckenridge, 688 P.2d at 443-44 (addressing issue raised for the first time on appeal 
and finding error); Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312-13 (stating a plea cannot be voluntary 
unless the defendant received "real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, 
the first, and most universally recognized, requirement of due process"); Thurman, 911 
P.2d at 374-75 (stating the court will determine whether the record supports a voluntary 
plea with facts sufficient for the offense; where defendant failed to admit sufficient facts, 
the plea was defective). 
The Prejudice. Next, the error here was prejudicial. As the Utah Supreme Court 
recognized in Breckenridge, Rule 11(e)(4) provides that a guilty plea may not be accepted 
unless the court has found that defendant understood the nature and the elements of the 
offense(s) to which he is entering a guilty plea. It stated, 
No such finding was explicitly made in this case, and indeed could not have been 
correctly made based on the defendant's statements to the prosecutor and the court 
at the time the plea was entered. 
On the basis of this record, we must conclude that Breckenridge did not 
understand the nature and elements of the crime to which he pled guilty. First, the 
record recites no factual basis from which we might conclude that an arson ever 
occurred. U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-102 requires as an element of arson that a person 
intentionally damage property. Neither in Breckenridgefs so-called "confession" 
nor in his relation of events to the trial court can we find any facts that show he 
intended to damage any property. The logical inference from what is in the record 
is that it was his job to dispose of old parts and that he believed burning them 
would be the easiest method. There would, therefore, have been no reason for 
Breckenridge to plead guilty to arson when arson had not been committed unless 
he mistakenly believed through a misapprehension of the nature and elements of 
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the crime that he had committed it in being responsible, accidentally or 
deliberately, for the burning of the parts. This inconsistency is amplified by the 
trial judge's explanation to Breckenridge that he was being specifically charged 
with "intentionally burning a building.ff This more specific charge makes even 
more obvious the absence of any facts showing the crime. As already indicated, 
the judge failed to make any finding on the record that Breckenridge understood 
the nature and elements of arson, as required by Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4), and we 
are convinced by the contents of the record that Breckenridge did not. 
Breckenridge, 688 P.2d at 443 (note omitted). The court ri ilecl that the conviction must be 
vacated and the plea set aside. Id. at 444. The lessons of Breckenridge apply here. 
While the trial court accepted McArthur's guilty pleas (R. 92:9), the court did not 
make any finding with respect to the nature of the elements for each separate offense or 
discuss their relationship to the facts here.4 Indeed, McArthur entered two guilt) pleas 
for a single incident through some misapprehension of the facts and the elements. On 
that basis the plea proceedings were fundamentally flawed. 
Also, as this Court has stated, "a trial court's 'failure to inform a defendant of the 
nature and elements of the offense is fatal to a guilty plea conviction " Ostler, 2000 I IT 
App 28, T[25 (cite omitted). If McArthur had been informed of the nature/elements of the 
separate offenses, and their relation to the facts of this case, he would not have pleaded 
guilty to two charges, see Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, ^ [26, particularly since his conduct 
supported only one offense. (See.R. 92:8 (identifying but not explaining dial "|1 |his same 
4 Although rule 11(e)(4)(A) required the judge in McArthur's case to find that defendant 
understood the nature and elements of the offenses to which the pleas were entered, no 
such finding was made. (See R. 92; 42; also 67-68); Breckenridge, 688 P.2d at 444. 
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conduct" at "the same location" "during the same time frame" for the "two different" 
offenses)); infra, subpart C.2., pp. 35-40, herein; Hall, 83 Cal. App. 4th at 1096, 100 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d at 288 (finding a single act). "Because '[a] guilty plea cannot be voluntary if it 
is uninformed,' defendant's guilty plea was involuntary, and therefore the trial court's 
error was prejudicial to defendant." Ostler. 2000 UT App 28, f26 (cite omitted). 
The court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion to withdraw his 
pleas where the record fails to support that McArthur understood the law for the separate 
crimes in relation to the facts of this case. See State v. Vasilacopulos. 756 P.2d 92, 95 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (record failed to support that defendant understood full plea 
ramifications), cert denied. 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988); Gibbons. 740 P.2d at 1312 
(recognizing that a plea may not be voluntary unless the defendant received "real notice 
of the true nature of the charge against him, the first, and most universally recognized, 
requirement of due process"). McArthur respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
trial court's ruling on the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. 
2. The Trial Court Failed to Ascertain Whether a Factual Basis for the Two 
Separate Guilty Pleas Existed. That Constitutes Plain Error Under Rule 
11(e)(4)(B). 
Finally, the guilty pleas are plainly and obviously defective where the record fails 
to support a "factual basis" for each guilty plea. See. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(B). 
According to Rule 11(e)(4)(B), "A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes that the 
charged crime was actually committed by the defendant, or, if the defendant refuses or is 
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otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to 
establish a substantial risk of conviction " I d I his Coin t has n lied that in assessing 
whether a factual basis exists for the plea, it will consider the record in its entirety. 
In State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), the state charged defen-
dant with four counts of aggravated robbery. Defendant ultimately "pled guilty to three 
counts of robbery pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162, 
91 S. Ct. 160 (1970), under which he maintained his innocence while pleading guilty in 
order to accept a favorable plea agreement." IcL at 669. During the plea colloquy in 
open court, the trial court compared the charges - to which defendant entered the pleas -
to the first-degree-felony charges thai the slate originally ' ^u "he record also 
contained a written statement that defendant signed and initialed. The statement 
identified the original charges and the reduced charges under the plea agreement, and it 
specified that defendant's attorney had "gone over the facts" of the cases "very carefully" 
with defendant, talked with key witnesses, ami obtained statements from the w itnesses in 
the cases. IdL 
Years after defendant entered the guilty pleas, he moved to withdraw them. He 
argued, among other things, that the trial court "failed to inquire adequately into the 
factual basis for Stilling's guilty plea. The argument stressed the inadequae\ of the pica 
hearing under both procedural and constitutional requirements for a guilty plea and 
requirements for an Alford plea in particular." Id. at 670. The trial court rejected the 
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arguments, and defendant appealed. On review, this Court specified that plea 
proceedings "must demonstrate that the defendant understood] the nature of each 
element of the offense charged and the burden on the State to prove each element beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(d). The requirement that the record as a whole 
demonstrate 'facts that would substantiate the prosecution of the charge at trial' has been 
described as the need for a factual basis for the plea." IdL. at 671 (cite omitted). 
This Court further stated, "the record must reveal either facts that would support 
the prosecution of a defendant at trial or facts that would suggest a defendant faces a 
substantial risk of conviction at trial, 'not merely facts establishing the defendant's 
motivation for entering the plea.'" Stilling, 856 P.2d at 672 (citing omitted); see. also id. 
at 674 ("In the more usual Rule 11 guilty plea situation, the factual basis requirement 
insures that a defendant understands the strength of the State's case and admits to each 
element of the charged crime"). 
In Stilling, this Court looked to the entire record to find a "factual basis, for pro-
secuting Stilling on the charges to which he pled." IcL at 676. The court found the pleas 
to be valid. McArthur's case compels a different result. 
The Plain and Obvious Error Here. Here, the record fails to support a factual 
basis for the convictions. "While the record as a whole need not be conclusive or 
uncontroverted on the question of guilt, 'there must be evidence from which a court 
could reasonably find that the defendant was guilty — a factual basis for the plea.'" 
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Milluiy, iS'vii I" M .il in <t (emphasis added) (tiling U.S. v. Owen, 858F.2d T 1 " i r i 7 
Considering that analysis here, in proceedings below , the state acknow ledgedpi c >-
blems with its original charges against McArthur for two counts of aggravated assault. 
.:>ee v - ;... . ;.u: >iate was willing to have McArthur plead guilty to b vo 
Significantly, during plea proceedings, the state failed to identify i Ihi'i» >' n 
factual basis for the double charges under § 76-10-506. (See R. 92); Stilling, 856 P.2d 
! .v, ,i:,i.:_ ..-. .he prosecutor to present a la^udi i\i>\^ lor the charges to 
\\\ - .;.- -
marshaled evidence in this case fails to support a factual basis for 'the 'two charges. 
To begin, the state charged McArthur with felony counts for allegedly assaulting 
I .iiii'ii mini Allon "n ill* a kniK1 (counts 1 and 11), and with misdemeanor counts for simple 
assiiiil* li,Tncsfk \ foiiiit r ti1 11 if prsni*, i.l , rh'hl "itn'^'iniu \ "Mi ;i (rliir H'ICIT, 
and intoxication (counts ill through VI). (R. 3-6.) Die trial court dismissed Uic nin-
ference charge and the state agreed to dismiss the charges for assault relating to Sherile, 
iiIiniKH«!i( uolaia in Iniiil iii Monica, and intoxication. (R,'l"i I<>.) The remaining 
charges related to McArthur's alleged use of II knitr in from oil Minn .iiid I auia. 
. After the state filed the information, the trial court conducted a preliminary 
hearing in the matter. Laura provided testimony relating to the knife. She stated that in 
late October 2002, she and Afton became aware of a fight outside their home between 
McArthur and Sherile. (R. 91:20.) When Laura and Afton went outside, Sherile ran 
into the house to grab the phone and call 9-1-1. Sherile came outside again, and 
McArthur struck her with his fist. He then disappeared. (R. 91:21-22.) 
Laura and Afton went back into the house, locked the doors, and sat with the 
lights on. (R. 91:22-23.) When McArthur returned to the house he asked to be let in. 
He then dislodged or kicked in a window screen that was "not really attached" (R. 91:29) 
and he unlatched the door. (R. 91:23) When he walked into the kitchen, he had an 
aspirin container. He picked up a ten inch knife to open the container. (R. 91:24, 30.) 
Laura saw McArthur struggle with "whatever he was trying to open, and we have 
a very small living room. I was sitting in a chair over here, and Mom was at the front 
door just kind of standing, and he came into the living room with the knife, and he went 
to the door and he says, 'Now we're going to turn off the lights and pretend like we're 
not home, and Mom, you're going to go lie down.5" (R. 91:24.) Laura indicated that 
McArthur held his fist in the air with the knife. (R. 91:24, 30-31.) When counsel asked 
Laura if the blade was pointed toward anyone, she testified that it was "kind of just 
random around." (R. 91:25.) He never held the knife toward Laura. (R. 91:31.) 
McArthur still held the knife as he walked to the door and turned off the porch 
lights and the television. Laura testified initially that McArthur was not moving the 
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I,, iiife nisi locking the dooi the lights with his hand and having the knife 
pointed the knife toward Afton. Laura testified, "If I recall correctly, and I ' m not 100 
percent sure about this, as he was going to the door it [the knife] was - I believe that it 
v\ as, yes. ' Il mi ill mi in ml pn iilii'i. t , but I do be lieu. I hat it \uis,"" (R, 'M ,J L) 
, \ l h i" K 1< : Vrlhur turned off the porch lights he •<»» i " u h-n < ^ (>l "lfc» ) 
McAr thur stood up and sat down repeatedly, "just a little," not saying much of anything. 
(R. 91:25.) Laura then walked to the front door, and she and Afton walked out to the 
fit: i H ill J: < i ; J: [I I 9 1 33 ] :- •-• • . .. - . 
I ai ira presented evidence of one ronliiiiious in< ideml \\ i 11 I ill'llit" h u l l ' See State \, 
Litt lejohm 582 S.E.2d 3 0 1 , 30? (N.C. App . 2003) (stating that for separate counts of as-
sault, the evidence "must establish ' a distinct interruption in the original assault followed 
In ,i , iui ihl iinitull I .sidle v. i asey., lllll I I I  App J h , l ] i> I. Ilh Jh 3» I'.Jd J!5 
(recognizing that the facts for the charges of aggravated assai ill: ail ::I at tempted n in in: ier 
were "separated b \ lime place and intervening circumstances"; the aggravated assault 
occurred o • , *> dcieiidani
 f)i».iikv. the gun at the v ic t im's face; the victim,, then left the car 
aitil when she KMIIIIII ill H11cH i l d f f i d i i i l i l n n e i lovui (llu: slioi I p m n l n l illlin" i'liiii ,il llu « mi 11n11 
and pul led the trigger, followed by shooting at her feet and again discii •' •; 
thereby consti tuting the at tempted murder charged cert, granted, ^2 P.3d 24^ \\ ^ h 
x'llHII |, Jlath K.i I al App, - . <, *,n . - •« n, M u a i a c t n r 
exhibiting a dangerous weapon occurs even when multiple officers are present). That is 
insufficient to support two charges for exhibiting a dangerous weapon under § 76-10-
506. See supra, subpart C.I., pp. 25-30, herein. 
The record also contained papers for the change of plea hearing (discussed supra. 
subparts A., B., C.I.), and papers for sentencing. In the presentence investigation report, 
McArthur denied using the knife as a weapon, threatening anyone with it, or pointing it 
at anyone. (R. 86, page 3.) Afton made no mention of an offense involving a knife (id., 
page 8), and Laura admitted "a dispute about what actually took place regarding the 
threat with the knife but she knows what she witnessed and the fear she felt." (Id.) 
Last, the record contained papers relating to the motion to withdraw the guilty 
pleas. There, McArthur moved to withdraw the pleas when he learned that Afton would 
provide testimony "which was favorable to him and which would not support the state's 
theory that he committed two counts of Aggravated Assault." (R. 56.) The state 
opposed the motion (R. 62-64) and the parties argued the matter to the court. During ar-
gument, the prosecutor admitted that the state "anticipate^] some difficulty with [Afton] 
and her cooperation with testimony in this case." (R. 87:4); Breckenridge, 688 P.2d at 
442 and n.l (recognizing that defendant based his claim for withdrawal of the plea in 
part on the fact that the state misrepresented the strength of its case). Notwithstanding 
the state's admission, the trial court denied the motion to withdraw the pleas. (R. 67-69.) 
As in Breckenridge, the record here fails to support a factual basis for the pleas: 
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liicic is IIII basis In uMiilutk' thai two instances of exhibiting a dangerous weapon ever 
i in in icd Ikeekenndge, f>KK I" "M it Ml ' I II I ("thr i n mil i n i t r I I I I fitcliiii! Iki1 IP Irnin 
which we might conclude that an arson ever occurred"); see. supra, subpart C.I . , herein. 
• The record in this case supports only one event,, the "same conduct" taking place 
during one "time frame w (iliout intervening circumstances, (Not K. y)l ,K | (lie 'same 
mi iiiiiiiiicl,""1" "same Mine Iraim"")), sec also Casey; . Ml > X 
that the facts for the two charges were "separated by time, place and intervening circum-
stances"), The record fails to contain a factual basis for a second charge o f " threatening 
ith or using [a] danger 01 is \ * sapon in a fight or quarrel' " in the presence of two or more 
persons i mder § 76-10-506. Su| >ra , si ill t; I lalL K '« " -il ' 'III1!'1 Ilh -il HI I"'" 
96 (the act of exhibiting a firearm in the presence of a peace officer constitutes a s i n ^ J 
act and cannot be punished ba^rd or fbc number of peace officer^ 
. >„ > i .. . . a single ^:. ^. . ,out 
understanding what he was don u • -. — 
Breckenridge, 688 T 2d a! 444; see also Utah R. Lrn:_. : \ 11(e)(4)(B) (pro\ iding that the 
court may not accept a guilty plea unless it has found a factual basis for the plea) 
ItSsiwung ui \!Mi ihlw i lliiuiin muni hi uti'snik'tll hi IIMIHHI lilt" IWH m haryes lim 
exhibiting a dangerous weapon under § 76-10-506, the record fails to si ipport that 
Mc Arthur understood the theory in the context of the separate charges and their relation 
:< >bv i.tctsof this case. See supra, subpart ( ^ institutes a due process 
» 
violation in the plea proceedings. See. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312-13; Breckenridge. 688 
P.2d at 443. Stated a different way, even if the record in this case may be sufficient to 
support the factual bases for two separate charges of "threatening with or using [a] dan-
gerous weapon in a fight or quarrel," the pleas were deficient; the two separate charges 
were not explained to McArthur. (See R., generally.) 
The trial court had the duty to ensure a factual basis for the guilty pleas and to 
explain the nature of each separate charge to McArthur so that he could understand "the 
elements of the crimes charged and the relationship of the law to the facts." Gibbons, 740 
P.2d at 1312; Thurman, 911 P.2d at 375 (stating that the record failed to support that 
defendant comprehended the nature/elements of the offense to which he pleaded guilty). 
The trial court failed in that duty. It failed to guard against the possibility that McArthur 
would plead to two separate crimes without sufficient understanding of the nature of 
each crime in relation to the facts. That constitutes plain and obvious error. See 
Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440. 
Next, to the extent the assessment under Rule 11(e)(4)(B) requires this Court to 
determine whether the record contained a factual basis for the original charges of 
aggravated assault (two counts), this Court should find that the record was deficient for 
the following reasons. First, as stated above, the state acknowledged problems with the 
original charges here, and therefore, was willing to have McArthur plead guilty to lesser 
charges. (R. 92:4-5; 87:4.) In that regard, the analysis here should focus on whether the 
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11 ( nrdlll i onl.unnl .1 IILu (mull IMSI 1 Inr (In i liaigcs unclei {5 'n III) illm i inu il did not (see 
supra, pp 35-40, herein), that ends the analysi* I \\r plna pnnvrd inps v\ r\v defirirnl 
Second, the marshaled evidence fails to support a risk of conviction under the 
original charges. To explain, for aggravated assault, the state was required to prove an > 
jy>iiiil!l 11 < .111 <tlh iii|il "1 il In mi 111 in I mi 11 Ii 11 Ii in i; 1111 (i mleitu In do hndil\ injur), a llireatto do 
bodily leji iry accompanied by a show oi force or violom » or .in «i 1 1 niiinnlltnl >\ ilii 
unlaw tul torce or violence thai creates a substan k of bodii} injur), Ltah Lode 
-ww ; ^um
 ti-c ni a dangerous weapon r r force likely to 
• • In this case, Laura testified at the preliminary hearing that ft U \ I 1111»» 
the living room with a knife that he used to open a bottle. (R. 91:24, 30.) He held the 
knife when lie turned out the lights and sat down (R 91:25-26.) According to Laura, 
Mc 
anything and did not verbally threaten Laura and Afton)), and lie aid iw> he knife 
in Laura 's direction (R. 91:31). , •. 
W hile I aura testified that she believed the knife was p o i n a J toward Afton as 
McArlhur vmit In II11111 1 n( (In lifhls, slin i in In I in I! hv sun 11"! '"Hil \ I  I I lull (ail;1, lb 
support aggravated assault. It fails to establish an attempt, threat, or act committed by 
McArthur to do bodily injury to Afton It also fails to establish iluf McArthur used the 
kinin n ifli 1  in in 1 in dii.ilt Inn nil ' 1 lence and n A manner 1;K*V - r wduce serious bodily 
injury toward Afton.5 See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(b). 
Also, Laura testified that she said the word "no" to McArthur a "couple of times." 
(R. 91:32.) Significantly, Laura did not remember why she said "no." (R. 91:32.) She 
did not claim to say it in connection with an attempt by, threat from, or act committed by 
McArthur to do bodily harm; she did not claim to say it in connection with any display of 
immediate/unlawful force or violence; and she did not claim to say it even in connection 
with McArthur's use of the knife. (See R. 91:32); also Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-102; 
-103(l)(b); supra note 5, herein. 
In sum, McArthur got a knife from the kitchen to open a bottle, he brought the 
knife into the living room, he held his arm in the air with the knife when he announced 
he would shut off the lights, and he continued to hold the knife while he turned the lights 
off and sat down. McArthur held the knife "kind of just random around" (R. 91:25); he 
was not moving it a whole lot, "just locking the door and turning off the lights with this 
hand and having the knife in his hand" (R. 91:26), and he did not make verbal threats. 
The evidence fails to support that McArthur attempted/threatened to do bodily 
5 During a preliminary hearing, a trial judge found that the evidence rose "to the level of 
a threat on both parties" and bound the defendant over on two counts of aggravated 
assault. (R. 91:45.) That is insufficient. For aggravated assault, the threat must be 
accompanied by a show of "immediate force or violence" and it must be a threat to do 
bodily harm. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-102, -103(l)(b). For example, if McArthur had 
threatened to take Laura's car and she said "no," that would not support aggravated 
assault. Also, the evidence must establish that McArthur used the knife in a manner 
likely to produce "serious bodily injury." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103. The evidence 
failed to establish those elements. 
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support unlawful force or violence toward Afton and Laura; and J • * * 
the knife in a manner likeh uuce serious injury. Utah Code \nn, §§ 76-5-;- , 
... ii^, . J :».. ,. -M ;u-rt a u.^,. •> ^a^is lor two counts of aggravated as-
<!.,l)1' l-'i" llln,11 in Jim I i  iiiiiiiii I ni'th ii/vd Ihc Mllalt" lor lading 
to recognize the weakness with the original charges); c)2;8 (the trial court ^ • 
one" found a basis for the two lesser charges, but failed to identify' the basis); 87:4); Utah 
K ("Viiii I • iiw-quHii.^  inecou1*! »* > i ^ ui.ii oasis for the pleas 
and to ens? • • f -lenses I, 
..-..:,Since the recu„ :._iw ian^ lo contain either a iaviuai oabis ior the crimes originally 
charged or for the crimes to which McArthur entered the guilty pleas, the plea 
proceedings failed lo eoiupl\ w ill!1! Rule I l(c ) That con? slil I ; pl-iin and obvious error. 
See Breckenridge, 68K VP d 4 41) 
The Prejudice. Since the judge did not make findings that McArthur understood 
the nature and elements of the two charges and their relation to the facts of this case, and 
tin n'cninl lails lo Mippoii (lie kit (iiiil bases loi Ihc guilty pleas, the pleas were unin- . 
formed. I hey "cannot be truly voluntai y " Hieckenndae. fVKK P ,M n,1 I I I, Uslki. ,M)()0 
UT App 28,112. Where the guilty pleas were involuntarily made, the convictions were 
entered without due process of law, Breckenridge. 688 P.2d at 444; see supra, subpart 
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it is uninformed/ defendant's guilty plea was involuntary, and therefore the trial court's 
error was prejudicial to defendant." Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, ^ [26 (cite omitted). 
In this case, after McArthur entered the guilty pleas, the trial court sentenced him 
to consecutive terms of incarceration for each separate offense. (R. 50-51.) The double 
sentences for incarceration from the uninformed guilty pleas constitutes harm. See supra, 
subpart C.I., herein; HaH, 83 Cal. App. 4th at 1096-97, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 289 (finding 
the multiple sentences to be improper, where a single act of exhibiting a dangerous 
weapon in the presence of officers occurred). 
McArthur respectfully requests that this Court enter an order reversing the trial 
court's ruling on the motion to withdraw guilty pleas. The convictions must be vacated 
and the pleas must be set aside. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d at 444; Thurman, 911 P.2d at 
374-75; Ostler. 2000 UT App 28, %H. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, McArthur requests that this Court reverse the trial 
court's ruling on the motion to withdraw guilty pleas, and remand the case for further 
proceedings in accordance with the law. McArthur is incarcerated; he is serving 
consecutive sentences at the Utah State Prison for the misdemeanor offenses. 
SUBMITTED this S^dav of ej^dt^Jb^. 2003. 
LINDA M.JONES' 
LISAREMAL 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDERS ASSOC. 
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SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Terms to run consecutive 
Dated this _^P"day of 
Pano 9 (laqt) 
ADDENDUM B 
76-10-506. Threatening with or using dangerous weapon 
in fight or quarrel. 
Every person, except those persons described in Section 76-10-503, who, not 
in necessary self defense in the presence of two or more persons, draws or 
exhibits any dangerous weapon in an angry and threatening manner or 
unlawfully uses the same in any fight or quarrel is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be 
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The 
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a 
reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason 
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative 
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or 
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not 
guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be 
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an 
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has know-
ingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the 
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court 
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense 
to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that 
the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant 
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that 
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion 
to withdraw the plea; and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record 
or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has 
established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the 
contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English 
language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to 
the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to 
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to 
make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included 
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by 
the court. 
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court 
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence 
is not binding on the court. 
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement 
and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge 
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the 
proposed disposition will be approved. 
(h)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in 
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and 
then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a 
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no 
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a 
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A 
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to 
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a 
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103. 
(Amended effective May 1,1993; January 1, 1996; November 1,1997; Novem-
ber 1, 2001; November 1, 2002.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (Supp. 2003) 
§ 76-5-102. Assault 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily 
injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to 
another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or 
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily injury to another. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999) 
§ 76-5-103. Aggravated assault 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section 76-5-
102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), uses a 
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1 -601 or other means or force likely to produce 
death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
RAYMOND DEAN McARTHUR, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
Case No. 021912108 
Judge J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
The above-entitled matter having come before this Court for hearing on April 7th, 
2003, in which Defendant was represented by counsel, Lisa Remal, and the State was 
represented by counsel, Alicia H. Cook, the Court having fully considered the written 
memoranda and oral arguments of counsel, this Court now enters its FINDINGS OF 
FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and ORDER. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The defendant was charged by an information filed on October 29th, 2002, 
with committing two counts of Aggravated Assault, one count of Assault, 
one count of Commission of Domestic Violence in the Presence of a 
Child, and one count of Interfering with a Peace Officer. On January 10th, 
2003, the defendant pled guilty to two counts of Threatening With or 
Using (a) Dangerous Weapon In (a) Fight or Quarrel under U.C.A. § 76-
10-506. The remaining charges were dismissed. The defendant, who was 
represented by counsel, informed the court that he understood the rights he 
was waiving by entering guilty pleas. The defendant moved to withdraw 
his guilty pleas on March 21st, 2003. 
2. The Court does not find that the defendant has demonstrated "good cause" 
as required under U.C.A. § 77-13-6(2)(a). The defendant represents that 
one of the witnesses to the Aggravated Assaults would give testimony 
favorable to him, and that this establishes the "good cause" required for 
the court to permit a withdrawal of his pleas. The defendant, however, 
had access to this witness and her information before he entered his pleas. 
Furthermore, this witness gave a statement in a pre-sentence report that 
she was hesitant to discuss the incident because she was afraid the 
defendant would be angry with her. The witness also stated that the 
defendant can manipulate her, and that she feels threatened by him. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing facts, the Court concludes as a matter of law that the 
defendant has not demonstrated "good cause" under U.C.A. § 77-13-6(2)(a). 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas is DENIED. 
^fe DATED this MTday of April, 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 




'•- 'V6 TfrPA'- - f o r ^ 
Lisa Remal 
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STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
Case No. C i^H U|CiT^ S 
I, I'UAM.-Yn^ v:! |Q . ^<-.4~vfWN . hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been 
advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights: 
Notification of Charges 
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes: 
B. 
D. 













Pjfrq fWyi'Kf 1. Offcft fivrrM r f tf\£ tfh.^- pl^C
 t-Wv rfivvii'.M'rv^ ^ t.irfr S 
. :iry. to Kg- cVSrs»vv<J —— 
i / 
1 
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or 
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am 
pleading guilty (or no contest). 
^ The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are: 
fc^s M person 'uJ'N? v^Cf-ji\ r^c€\vjrt . i Self1 dfftmcL. n\ The _ 
iMavAjf-ilU i /vv fhf Sfov^. Vr\7?iiM,| -fij^Kt- cr <^^ge 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crime 
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest I am not contesting that I committed tfa 
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest I do not dispute c 
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons fc 
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guil 
(or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guill 
(or no contest): 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rigl 
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I pie 
guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights: 
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that 
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understs 
that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the 
appointed lawyer's service to me. 
I (have not})(have) waived my right to counsel, if Ihavewaived-my--right to counsel^ 
I4iave.4one-so4£ne^ , aiidToluntarily for the following reasons:-
IjHIiave waived my rigbHtfcoui)sel, I certify thatjUraVe read th& statement and that 
I understand tne nature and"elements of the charges-aUHcrimes to which I am pleadinsrsuUtv 
Jtfr no cutest). JKalso understand mv^rights in this case ^ndj}thefcases and the 
consequ^nce^Ji my guilty (or n^gontest) plea(s). 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is L i£fl J . i fnv[ | 
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of 
my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest). 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have 
a jury trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against 
me and b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the 
opportunity to cross-examine ail of the witnesses who testified against me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call 
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and 
testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the 
State would pay those costs. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to 
have a jury* trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I 
chose not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. 
I also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my 
refusal to testify against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead 
guilty (or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the 
charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," 
and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving 
each element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the 
verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of 
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or 
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the 
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up 
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up ail 
the statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each 
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest), fknow that by-pleading guilty (or no-
-«coHtest)4e-a-crime thatcames amandatory penaltyyl-will be-subjeetinf-myseifUo-^mng-
^-mandatory penalty for that crime- I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or 
both. ' ^Ju\ 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be 
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my 
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of 
a plea agreement. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime 
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run 
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each 
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing 
on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no 
contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences beins 
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was 
imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be 
inappropriate. 
Plea bargain. My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are) (is/are not) the result of a plea 
bargain between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and 
provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those 
explained below: 
>e* (pfoy. on£ 
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges 
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not 
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they 
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge. 
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises 
except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I 
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to 
change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes 
because all of the statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of mv attorney. <,,,, 
I a m x i years of age. I have attended school through the L «/ grade. I can read 
and understand the English language, if! do not understand English, an interpreter-has been— 
-provided to me.-1 was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants 
which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under 
the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental 
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing 
or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must 
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) within 30 days after I have been sentenced 
and final judgment has been entered. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I 
show good cause. I will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after 30 days for any 
reason. 




Certificate of Defense Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for fux^-p^n^ ft />x l i tThur ' ' . the defendant 
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have 
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its 
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, 
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of 
the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are 
accurate and true. 
0 k^J 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
Bar No. z~l'- h 
Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against 
I U^-yn^a /) »^ c ,%ul< i s . defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant 
and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the 
offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage 
a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the 
Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the 
Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction 
of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance 
of the plea(s) would serve the public interest. 
iJU^A^j 
PROSECUTING ATTG 
Bar No. %8Z\ 
Order 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses 
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, 
knowingly, and voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the 
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered. 
Dated this $ * > dav of 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on January 10, 2003) 
3 THE COURT: State of Utah vs. Raymond Dean McArthur, 
4 case No. CR-02108. Ms. Remal, you are appearing in his behalf 
5 and Ms. Cook for the State. 
6 MS. REMAL: I am. 
7 THE COURT: Are you Raymond Dean McArthur? 
8 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir, I am. 
9 THE COURT: Ms. Remal is your lawyer; is that correct? 
10 MR. MCARTHUR: That's correct. 
11 THE COURT: This matter is on the calendar incident 
12 to a proposed resolution. What is it your are proposing here, 
13 Ms. Remal? 
14 MS. REMAL: Your Honor, what we're proposing is that 
15 Mr. McArthur will be pleading guilty to amended Count I and 
16 amended Count II. Both will be amended to reflect threatening 
17 with or using a dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel. That's 
18 pursuant to 76-10-506. Upon entry of those pleas, I anticipate 
19 that the State will move to dismiss the remaining counts 
20 against him in this matter. The State is also willing to agree 
21 to recommend a reduction in bail for Mr. McArthur once those 
22 pleas have been entered. 
23 THE COURT: The resulting charges are what? 
24 MS. REMAL: Threatening with or using dangerous weapon 
25 in fight or quarrel. 
-3-
1 THE COURT: Which i s — 
2 MS. REMAL: If I can approach, I have a copy of that. 
3 THE COURT: What is that, a misdemeanor or something? 
4 MS. REMAL: It's a class A misdemeanor, yes. 
5 THE COURT: Do you have an amended Information, Ms. 
6 Cook? 
7 MS. COOK: (Inaudible). 
8 THE COURT: To your knowledge, then, Ms. Remal, after 
9 pleas to the class A's, do you believe that the rest of the 
10 Information is to be dismissed? 
11 MS. REMAL: Yes. 
12 THE COURT: And to your knowledge that constitutes the 
13 entirety of the proposed resolution? 
14 MS. REMAL: Except that I understand Ms. Cook will 
15 join me in recommending to the Court that Mr. McArthur's bail 
16 be reduced to $10,000. I did file a formal motion. I hope it 
17 made its way to your file. 
18 THE COURT: It is here. Now insofar as the proposed 
19 resolution is concerned, Ms. Remal, have you discussed it with 
20 Mr. McArthur? 
21 MS. REMAL: I have. 
22 THE COURT: And you've gone over the statement of the 
23 defendant with him? 
24 MS. REMAL: I have. 
25 THE COURT: Are you persuaded he understands the 
-4-
1 effect and meaning of what he's about to do here? 
2 MS. REMAL: Yes. 
3 THE COURT: Does that fairly state the proposed 
4 resolution, Ms. Cook, and if it does, will you state why? 
5 MS. COOK: It does (inaudible) your Honor. I would 
6 like to inform the Court that Count IV of the Information was 
7 not bound over (inaudible). 
8 THE COURT: The class B, one of the class B's? 
9 (Ms. Cook stood over at end of table away from 
10 microphone, which made it impossible to get every 
11 word) 
12 MS. COOK: Interfering a peace officer making an 
13 arrest is not (inaudible). The prelim on this case a few weeks 
14 ago, and the evidence presented by my witnesses (inaudible) 
15 terribly strong in regards to (inaudible) amended Information 
16 (inaudible). 
17 THE COURT: Have you discussed this with the victim? 
18 Are victims involved? 
19 MS. COOK: The victims have been informed and 
20 (inaudible). 
21 MS. REMAL: The victims are relatives of 
22 Mr. McArthur's, your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: Well, yeah, I see a domestic violence type 
24 of a case (inaudible). The question, though, it occurs to me 
25 that it was not until the preliminary hearing, you realized 
-5-
1 that that didn't have a third degree. 
2 MS. COOK: Your Honor (inaudible). 
3 THE COURT: Well, of course. 
4 MS. COOK: Okay (inaudible). 
5 THE COURT: Exercising acute critical analysis 
6 yourself, you came to the conclusion that you didn't have it? 
7 MS. COOK: I think (inaudible) trial after hearing the 
8 witness testify. 
9 THE COURT: Well, was it the first time it occurred to 
10 you, at the preliminary? 
11 MS. COOK: Yes. 
12 THE COURT: You hadn't discussed this matter with your 
13 witnesses previously? 
14 MS. COOK: No (inaudible). 
15 THE COURT: All right. You say that the victims are 
16 relieved to have this matter resolved. 
17 MS. COOK: They're satisfied (inaudible). 
18 THE COURT: Mr. McArthur, do you understand what's 
19 being proposed here? 
20 MR. MCARTHUR: I'm quite sure (inaudible). 
21 THE COURT: Well, you've talked to your lawyer about 
22 it, haven't you? 
23 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes. 
24 THE COURT: You've gone over that statement with your 
25 lawyer, haven't you? 
-6-
1 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
2 THE COURT: Do you understand that statement? 
3 MR- MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
4 J THE COURT: Do you have any questions at all about it? 
5 MR. MCARTHUR: No, sir. 
6 I THE COURT: Have any threats or promises been made to 
7 you or against you to get you to enter into these plea 
8 agreements other than what has been stated in open court? 
9 MR. MCARTHUR: No, sir. 
10 THE COURT: You're doing this freely and voluntarily? 
11 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
12 THE COURT: You understand, Mr. McArthur, by pleading 
13 guilty you're waiving certain constitutional rights that you 
14 otherwise have. 
15 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
16 THE COURT: Including the right to by tried by a jury 
17 of eight people, the right to require the State to prove their 
18 case against you beyond a reasonable doubt to the unanimous 
19 satisfaction of a jury of eight people, the right to confront 
20 and cross examine witnesses produced by the State against you, 
21 the right to compel the attendance of witnesses in your own 
22 behalf at no cost to you, the right to take the stand and 
23 testify in your own behalf, if you choose, or remain silent 
24 during the trial, if you choose, and the right to appeal in the 



























well as the right to be presumed innocent until you're found 
guilty if you are, all of which rights, as well as the others 
contained on that statement that we may not have discussed 
you're waiving by the entry of a guilty plea. Do you 
understand that? 
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir, I do. 
THE COURT: And knowing those waivers, do you want to 
proceed with this plea arrangement that the lawyers now have 
decided upon? 
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And you're doing this freely and 
voluntarily? 
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Are you prepared to sign that statement at 
this time? 
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: You may do so. 
(Defendant signs statement) 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, if I may approach, Mr. 
McArthur has now signed the statement (inaudible) as well. 
THE COURT: Very well, thank you. Indeed both Counsel 
and defendant have signed the statement. Mr. McArthur, you 
understand by having signed this statement you are admitted is 
true and correct the following facts and elements involved in 
two separate counts of threatening with or using a dangerous 
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1 weapon in a fight or a quarrel, specifically that on or about 
2 the 26th of October of last year through the 27th of October of 
3 last year, at the location of 309 North, 1000 West in Salt Lake 
4 County, you, according to the offense, did not in self defense 
5 draw or exhibit a dangerous weapon in an angry or threatening 
6 manner or unlawfully used the same in a fight or quarrel. 
7 Those facts and elements are true and correct, are they not, 
8 sir? 
9 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
10 THE COURT: This same conduct, which is constituted as 
11 a threat of a dangerous — use of a dangerous weapon in a fight 
12 occurred at the same location, 309 North, 1000 West during the 
13 same timeframe, the 26th/27th October on two different 
14 occasions. 
15 MS. REMAL: It was during one incident, your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: Well, there's two different charges. 
17 MS. REMAL: Right. 
18 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes. 
19 THE COURT: So someone has been able to find that 
20 there were two separate incidences going on here, even though 
21 it may have been part of the same larger fight, right? You're 
22 prepared to plead to two separate charges— 
23 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, there— 
24 THE COURT: —involving the use of threatening use of 
25 a dangerous weapon. 
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1 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Those facts and elements as they relate to 
3 the use of dangerous weapons, specifically a knife, did occur 
4 during the time frame as indicated at the location stated; is 
5 that right, sir? 
6 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
7 THE COURT: Do you understand that those facts and 
8 elements constitute two separate class A misdemeanor crimes for 
9 which you could be sentenced by this Court for a period of up 
10 to one year in the Adult Detention Center and fined a sum of 
11 $2500 plus a surcharge. That's clear to you; is it not? 
12 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
13 THE COURT: And knowing the potential penalty of one 
14 year and/or a $2500 fine on each of the two, do you want to 
15 proceed with this arrangement these lawyers have worked out? 
16 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
17 THE COURT: You understand furthermore that if I 
18 determine to commit you to the jail, those terms in jail could 
19 well be consecutive as opposed to concurrent? 
20 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
21 THE COURT: I will therefore accept your statement if 
22 it is executed freely and voluntarily, Mr. McArthur, which I 
23 assume it is? 
24 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir (inaudible). 
25 THE COURT: Very well. Due to the charges as set 
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1 forth in Count I of the Information has now been amended by 
2 interlineation to threat — threatening use of a dangerous 
3 weapon during a quarrel, a class A misdemeanor. To Count I 
4 what is you plea? 
5 MR. MCARTHUR: Guilty. 
6 THE COURT: Count II, threatening use of a dangerous 
7 weapon during a quarrel, a class A misdemeanor. To Count II 
8 what is you plea? 
9 MR. MCARTHUR: Guilty. 
10 THE COURT: I will accept your guilty pleas and 
11 dismiss the balance of this information. In the interest of 
12 justice you have the right now to be sentenced in no less than 
13 two nor more than 45 days from today's date. I'll schedule 
14 your matter for sentencing. 
15 COURT CLERK: February 21st. 
16 THE COURT: The 21st of February, which is Friday 
17 morning at 8:30. In addition, you have the right for good 
18 cause shown in no more than 30 days from the date of sentencing 
19 to move to set aside the guilty pleas entered here. 
20 Now Counsel, there is a motion to reduce bail, and 
21 you're prepared, I'm advised, Ms. Cook to concur with or at 
22 least not object to that motion? 
23 MS. COOK: That's correct. 
24 THE COURT: What kind of threat does this man pose to 
25 the victims involved? 
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1 MS„ COOK: Well, it was my understanding that he 
2 (inaudible) he would stay entirely away from them, I'm 
3 (inaudible). 
4 MS. REMAL: Your Honor, I can respond to that, I 
5 think. As I stated in the motion, we expect that if his bail 
6 were reduced the Court certainly would order him to stay away 
7 from the individuals involved in this case, which is his 
8 mother, his sister and his daughter. 
9 He has another relative, a niece, that provided her 
10 name and address with whom he can reside. He still has 
11 employment available to him, but probably more important than 
12 anything is his intention to immediately seek treatment for 
13 alcohol abuse. At the time of this event, it's clear that Mr. 
14 McArthur had been consuming alcohol, and we understand that 
15 that has created a lot of problems for him in his life and 
16 certainly contributed greatly to his inability to control his 
17 behavior on this night. I don't know for sure, but I expect 
18 that if his family were consulted, they would probably indicate 
19 that use of alcohol makes a huge difference in his behavior. 
20 THE COURT: Well, since the State doesn't seem to be 
21 particularly concerned about the reduction and is willing to 
22 agree to it, I have no basis upon which to challenge the wisdom 
23 of the stipulation of reduced bail. I will therefore grant the 
24 request to reduce the bail. 
25 Now Mr. McArthur, as far as you and I are concerned, 
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1 if you happen to make bail, you will absolutely have no contact 
2 whatever with any of the victims involved in this matter. Is 
3 that clear to you? 
4 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir, 
5 THE COURT: And you will absolutely not engage in the 
6 use of any alcohol or illicit substances during this pre-
7 sentence period; do you understand? 
8 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: All right. You follow those terms and 
10 keep in touch with your lawyer, but you be back here for 
11 sentencing on the date of the 21st of February at 8:30 in the 
12 event you're going to make bail. We'll provide you with a 
13 referral slip here that has the address of Adult Probation and 
14 Parole on it. If you make bail you must go immediately to the 
15 office of the AP&P, give them the information they need to do 
16 the pre-sentence report. Is that clear? 
17 MR. ARTHUR: Yes, your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. That will be the 
19 order. 
20 MS. REMAL: Your Honor, if I may approach, I have 
21 prepared a not very nice looking, but I think a document that 
22 would reflect (inaudible) order (inaudible). 
23 THE COURT: That's fine (inaudible). 
24 MS. REMAL: Your Honor, Ms. Cook is suggesting that we 
25 make sure that the trial date, which was set for the 21st and 
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22nd is stricken. I'm assuming— 
THE COURT: Well, of course, 
(Hearing concluded) 
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